Dr. Dimitrij Rupel: Moving the Western Balkans from Security to
Stability and Euro-Atlantic Integration
Washington, 29 March 2004
Honorable guests and friends, ladies and gentlemen,
Following a decade of almost perpetual conflict, the Western
Balkans region is no longer threatened by inter-state war. A regional
security structure is in place -- for the most part. Cooperation is
picking up, and states are restoring diplomatic dialogue.
However, lasting stability as we were again reminded by the recent
outbreak of violence in Kosovo is somewhat distant. Western Balkans
history teaches us that international complacency and disinterest are
rarely rewarded. To this effect, the Western Balkans stabilization
processes -- and with this our job -- will not be completed until all
the states in this region join the Euro-Atlantic Community. Slovenia
will continue promoting Western Balkans membership in both EU and
NATO.
With the next EU enlargement just around the corner, and with
Romania and Bulgaria scheduled to enter in 2007, we need to assign
timelines for Western Balkans integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community. This region cannot stay a permanent security concern
engulfing the EU states.
Western Balkans stabilization will succeed if all of us -- the
U.S., Europe and the Western Balkan states -- work under the same
timeline, and with the same goal in mind: towards a Europe whole, free
and prosperous. To this end, the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe has done much to strengthen regional cooperation and
coordination.
Croatia has made significant steps in reforming its legal,
economic, social and democratic institutions, and should be encouraged
in its efforts to begin accession negotiations. Slovenia stands in
support of Croatia's EU membership bid, and Ljubljana has already
offered Zagreb cooperation in preparing for the accession phase, as
well as in managing negotiations with Brussels. Slovenia will strive
to ensure that Croatia's membership application to the EU is not
tainted by the Union's enlargement fatigue, but is rather judged on
its merits and the progress made.
However, there are no shortcuts to EU or NATO membership. The
entry process is not a political tit-for-tat, but a process towards
democratic reform and economic prosperity. At this point, there is a
real absence of factors for self-sustaining economic growth in the
region, while unemployment remains strikingly high.
Macedonia has been largely successful in implementing the
provisions of the Ohrid Agreement. The debate in Macedonia has
shifted toward addressing the power and institutional arrangements of
the Ohrid Agreement and towards making Macedonia's institutions both
more effective and more EU compatible. Slovenia welcomes Macedonia's
application for EU membership.
The danger that Bosnia and Herzegovina will come undone is no
longer pressing. The problem in Bosnia today is in the vast
bureaucracy, lack of real economic progress, infrastructural
underdevelopment, and organized crime which really is a transnational
problem, and which Bosnia alone cannot overcome.
The NATO mission in Bosnia has been a success. Security is
widespread, while refugees and internally displaced persons continue
being repatriated. A transfer of security responsibilities to the EU
is now inevitable, and logical. Transformation of political power
from OHR to the local level in Bosnia must continue. It is equally
important that a component of American military remains present. It
matters on the symbolic level. American participation in counter
terrorism efforts, and fighting other elements of organized crime in
the area is needed.
Organized crime and proliferation of illicit material throughout
the Western Balkans security zone constitutes a paramount problem for
regional stability and democratic and economic reform processes.
Western Balkans is a major point of transit for proliferators -- be it
proliferation associated with human trafficking, drugs, small arms and
light weapons, and even terrorists. We cannot overlook nor
underemphasize the possibility that these same networks may be used to
sponsor other illicit activities. While many regional initiatives to
combat organized crime are already in place, an out-of-area
interdiction structure would certainly complement and strengthen
in-area efforts.
The future of Kosovo is no doubt the most complex problem left to
address. Ambiguity over the final status is overshadowing the
dialogue and relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and also between
Belgrade and Tirana. The recent violence has helped revive the
zero-sum atmosphere, in which each side interprets its gains and
losses in relative rather than actual terms.
The seriousness of economic stagnation in Kosovo is very worrying.
One of the problems of an "independent Kosovo," and also of
Kosovo as a part of Serbia would be its economic and institutional
weakness. Kosovo's economy mainly relies on public sector jobs,
agriculture and organized crime. Official unemployment is around 70%,
while changes in the demographic structure of the population indicate
that Kosovo will need to increase the job market by 50%. Perpetual
ambiguity on the statues question inhibits international financial
institutions from granting more generous financial assistance to
Kosovo, but also keeps direct and indirect private investment away.
Kosovo must become a functioning community with democratic
institutions, and a net contributor to regional, and eventually,
Euro-Atlantic cohesion and security. A European perspective for
Kosovo should imply a European solution in the area of decision-making
(i.e. modeling local decision-making on the EU process).
Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and between Kosovo
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs is needed. Unfortunately, the recent
violence has done much to undermine this prospect. Preserving a
multiethnic Kosovo is a priority. A discussion of status is often
confused with a discussion about mission and historic justice.
Structural reforms came to a standstill in Serbia in 2003. The
political crisis which was heightened by the assassination of Prime
Minister Djindjic has held up large-scale privatization, bank
restructuring and key economic legislation; though much progress has
recently been made in reforming the military and security sectors.
2006 is an important year for both Belgrade and Podgorica, and the
international community cannot exclude the possibility of
disintegration of the state union. Despite this, reforms should be
strengthened and the micro-economic situation improved. The deep
socioeconomic distress is helping keep nationalism and radicalism on
the Serbian political stage.
In the last couple of years, Western Balkan states have, it seems,
changed their threat perceptions and strategic configurations to
resemble the 21st Century security realities. Croatia, Macedonia and
Albania are on the doorstep of NATO membership, with Serbia and Bosnia
both seeking PfP status. Full cooperation with the ICTY is a
precondition to both NATO and EU membership, and a prerequisite for a
successful and complete reconciliation process.
As we gather today in Washington to put a final stamp on the 2nd
phase of post-Cold War NATO enlargement, it is high time to review
NATO's Western Balkans priorities. As a member of EU and NATO,
Slovenia will work to keep EU and NATO doors open to our Western
Balkan friends. Ljubljana will strive towards strengthening its
already good relations with the Western Balkan states, and work within
Europe, NATO and the Western Balkans region to ensure that standards
are being met and that the processes of reform are moving the region
in the direction of long-term stability.
Finally, a transatlantic understanding -- on the basis of a common
strategy -- concerning the political and financial resources is
required. I trust that today's conference will produce valuable ideas
on how as a community of friends and partners we can work to maximize
our efforts in stabilizing the Western Balkans region, and soon
welcome these states as members in both NATO and the EU. With this in
mind, I wish you all a productive conference.
Thank you.
| 
