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NOVINARSKO SREDIŠČE

Nastop ministra dr. Rupla na konferenci "Od varnosti k razvoju Zahodnega Balkana"

Washington, 29. marca 2004

Moving the Western Balkans from Security to Stability and Euro-Atlantic Integration

Honorable guests and friends, ladies and gentlemen,

Following a decade of almost perpetual conflict, the Western Balkans region is no longer threatened by inter-state war. A regional security structure is in place -- for the most part. Cooperation is picking up, and states are restoring diplomatic dialogue.

However, lasting stability as we were again reminded by the recent outbreak of violence in Kosovo is somewhat distant. Western Balkans history teaches us that international complacency and disinterest are rarely rewarded. To this effect, the Western Balkans stabilization processes -- and with this our job -- will not be completed until all the states in this region join the Euro-Atlantic Community. Slovenia will continue promoting Western Balkans membership in both EU and NATO.

With the next EU enlargement just around the corner, and with Romania and Bulgaria scheduled to enter in 2007, we need to assign timelines for Western Balkans integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. This region cannot stay a permanent security concern engulfing the EU states.

Western Balkans stabilization will succeed if all of us -- the U.S., Europe and the Western Balkan states -- work under the same timeline, and with the same goal in mind: towards a Europe whole, free and prosperous. To this end, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has done much to strengthen regional cooperation and coordination.

Croatia has made significant steps in reforming its legal, economic, social and democratic institutions, and should be encouraged in its efforts to begin accession negotiations. Slovenia stands in support of Croatia's EU membership bid, and Ljubljana has already offered Zagreb cooperation in preparing for the accession phase, as well as in managing negotiations with Brussels. Slovenia will strive to ensure that Croatia's membership application to the EU is not tainted by the Union's enlargement fatigue, but is rather judged on its merits and the progress made.

However, there are no shortcuts to EU or NATO membership. The entry process is not a political tit-for-tat, but a process towards democratic reform and economic prosperity. At this point, there is a real absence of factors for self-sustaining economic growth in the region, while unemployment remains strikingly high.

Macedonia has been largely successful in implementing the provisions of the Ohrid Agreement. The debate in Macedonia has shifted toward addressing the power and institutional arrangements of the Ohrid Agreement and towards making Macedonia's institutions both more effective and more EU compatible. Slovenia welcomes Macedonia's application for EU membership.

The danger that Bosnia and Herzegovina will come undone is no longer pressing. The problem in Bosnia today is in the vast bureaucracy, lack of real economic progress, infrastructural underdevelopment, and organized crime which really is a transnational problem, and which Bosnia alone cannot overcome.

The NATO mission in Bosnia has been a success. Security is widespread, while refugees and internally displaced persons continue being repatriated. A transfer of security responsibilities to the EU is now inevitable, and logical. Transformation of political power from OHR to the local level in Bosnia must continue. It is equally important that a component of American military remains present. It matters on the symbolic level. American participation in counter terrorism efforts, and fighting other elements of organized crime in the area is needed.

Organized crime and proliferation of illicit material throughout the Western Balkans security zone constitutes a paramount problem for regional stability and democratic and economic reform processes. Western Balkans is a major point of transit for proliferators -- be it proliferation associated with human trafficking, drugs, small arms and light weapons, and even terrorists. We cannot overlook nor underemphasize the possibility that these same networks may be used to sponsor other illicit activities. While many regional initiatives to combat organized crime are already in place, an out-of-area interdiction structure would certainly complement and strengthen in-area efforts.

The future of Kosovo is no doubt the most complex problem left to address. Ambiguity over the final status is overshadowing the dialogue and relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and also between Belgrade and Tirana. The recent violence has helped revive the zero-sum atmosphere, in which each side interprets its gains and losses in relative rather than actual terms.

The seriousness of economic stagnation in Kosovo is very worrying. One of the problems of an "independent Kosovo," and also of Kosovo as a part of Serbia would be its economic and institutional weakness. Kosovo's economy mainly relies on public sector jobs, agriculture and organized crime. Official unemployment is around 70%, while changes in the demographic structure of the population indicate that Kosovo will need to increase the job market by 50%. Perpetual ambiguity on the statues question inhibits international financial institutions from granting more generous financial assistance to Kosovo, but also keeps direct and indirect private investment away.

Kosovo must become a functioning community with democratic institutions, and a net contributor to regional, and eventually, Euro-Atlantic cohesion and security. A European perspective for Kosovo should imply a European solution in the area of decision-making (i.e. modeling local decision-making on the EU process).

Direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs is needed. Unfortunately, the recent violence has done much to undermine this prospect. Preserving a multiethnic Kosovo is a priority. A discussion of status is often confused with a discussion about mission and historic justice.

Structural reforms came to a standstill in Serbia in 2003. The political crisis which was heightened by the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic has held up large-scale privatization, bank restructuring and key economic legislation; though much progress has recently been made in reforming the military and security sectors. 2006 is an important year for both Belgrade and Podgorica, and the international community cannot exclude the possibility of disintegration of the state union. Despite this, reforms should be strengthened and the micro-economic situation improved. The deep socioeconomic distress is helping keep nationalism and radicalism on the Serbian political stage.

In the last couple of years, Western Balkan states have, it seems, changed their threat perceptions and strategic configurations to resemble the 21st Century security realities. Croatia, Macedonia and Albania are on the doorstep of NATO membership, with Serbia and Bosnia both seeking PfP status. Full cooperation with the ICTY is a precondition to both NATO and EU membership, and a prerequisite for a successful and complete reconciliation process.

As we gather today in Washington to put a final stamp on the 2nd phase of post-Cold War NATO enlargement, it is high time to review NATO's Western Balkans priorities. As a member of EU and NATO, Slovenia will work to keep EU and NATO doors open to our Western Balkan friends. Ljubljana will strive towards strengthening its already good relations with the Western Balkan states, and work within Europe, NATO and the Western Balkans region to ensure that standards are being met and that the processes of reform are moving the region in the direction of long-term stability.

Finally, a transatlantic understanding -- on the basis of a common strategy -- concerning the political and financial resources is required. I trust that today's conference will produce valuable ideas on how as a community of friends and partners we can work to maximize our efforts in stabilizing the Western Balkans region, and soon welcome these states as members in both NATO and the EU. With this in mind, I wish you all a productive conference.

Thank you.


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