Putting Europe First
Survival, Spring 2002, by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier
The Bush administration enters office at a time when flash-points
around the globe - from the Middle East to Colombia and from the
Persian Gulf to the Taiwan Straits - threaten to explode. This
contrasts starkly with a Europe that today is relatively
quiescent. The violence that bloodied south-eastern Europe throughout
much of the 1990s has ended. Slobodan Milosevic, the man most
responsible for Europe's recent instability, has been swept from
office. Except for isolated pockets like Belarus, democracy is
ascendant throughout the continent. America's oldest friends are
creating an ever-closer union amongst themselves based on a single
currency and a common defence and security policy. And Russia, though
still struggling to emerge from decades of disastrous economic and
political mismanagement, no longer threatens Europe's stability and
security.
As Europe remains quiet and increasingly capable of taking care of
itself, the new administration in Washington may be tempted to
concentrate American efforts elsewhere around the globe. Bush's
national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, suggested as much towards
the end of last year's presidential campaign. She said that Bush
favoured a 'new division of labour' that would leave extended
peacekeeping missions in Europe, such as those in the Balkans, to the
Europeans so that the United States could focus its energies
elsewhere. 'The United States is the only power that can handle a
showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force that is needed to
protect Saudi Arabia and deter a crisis in the Taiwan Straits,' Rice
stated.1
Rice's remarks caused quite a stir in Europe, and there
were immediate efforts by the Bush campaign to downplay the suggestion
of an early withdrawal of US troops from the Balkans.2
Since then,
Bush, Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell have reaffirmed the US
commitment to the Balkans and assured that an American troop
withdrawal would be subject to extensive consultations and would not
be precipitous.3
Largely missing from the public reactions to Rice's call for a new
division of labour was the other side of the proposed division: the
idea that the United States alone should bear responsibility for
dealing with flash-points in the Middle East and Asia. Yet this idea
has major drawbacks. Although America today enjoys unrivalled
military, economic and political power, it lacks the capacity to deal
with many of the critical global challenges - ranging from weapons
proliferation and terrorism to environmental degradation and the rapid
spread of infectious disease - without support from allies. There are
also fundamental political problems with such an approach. The
unilateralism implied by assigning primary responsibility for global
security and stability to the United States without support from or
regard for the perspective of regional allies and other countries is
hardly consistent with the desire, repeatedly emphasised by the
incoming team, to exercise American power 'without arrogance and to
pursue its interests without hectoring and bluster'.4
At a time when the United States is already regarded by much of the
world as an overbearing 'hyperpower', insisting on a division of
labour that assigns Washington the main international security role to
the exclusion of others is unlikely to be popular among its
allies. Such a posture is also unlikely to be popular at home. In
recent years, it has become very clear that the American public will
support the use of US military forces overseas only if other countries
share the burden. This is not only in the case of so-called
humanitarian interventions, but also when it involves the defence of
such vital national interests as the world's supply of crude oil. In
either case, international legitimacy of action and a commitment by
other nations to share the costs will be a political prerequisite for
gaining public support. Despite Europe's internal weaknesses and
divisions, no part of the world offers the United States a better
prospect for becoming a strong partner in taking on global challenges
and opportunities. Europe combines actual economic strength with
potential military and diplomatic capacity to be America's strategic
partner, if not today, then tomorrow. And rather than assigning Europe
a limited, albeit still important role, of handling its own affairs in
ways that do not require US participation, as the new division of
labour suggests, American interests are best served by developing a
genuine partnership with a Europe that is both capable and willing to
share the burdens of maintaining and strengthening international
security.
Regardless of pressing developments in other parts of the world,
the United States cannot afford to ignore Europe. The Bush
administration appears to recognise this, notwithstanding the rhetoric
about a new division of labour. Candidate Bush and incoming
policy-makers consistently pointed to the need for strengthening US
alliances as one of the first items of business, reflecting at least a
concern for maintaining America's strong bonds within NATO.5
Even more importantly, the many Europe-related issues requiring decisions
in the near-future - including NATO enlargement, the future of
Europe's defence policy, national missile defence, US troops in the
Balkans and relations with Russia - will make it impossible for the
new administration to ignore Europe. The question for the new
administration, therefore, is not whether Europe still matters, but
rather, what should be America's strategy for addressing the array of
issues on the European agenda. These issues, and the US approach to
them, will determine the nature and depth of the US-European
relationship. Some, including many in the Bush administration, will
argue that a strategy based on American leadership in NATO will be
needed for the years ahead. They will contend that the main problems
facing US-European relations are the result of recent efforts to
dilute NATO and thereby undermine the main vehicle for realising
America's continued strategic interests in Europe. Others are more
concerned that developments in Russia will determine Europe's future,
and they accordingly counsel a policy that gives Moscow's interests
and perspective a critical role in resolving the issues on the
European agenda. Neither a NATO-first nor a Russia-first policy
towards Europe will best serve American interests, however. A strong
NATO and amicable relations with Russia are, of course, important. But
they are means to a desired end, not ends in themselves. The end is a
strong Europe that is capable of being a strategic partner of the
United States in meeting the multitude of global challenges. The means
to that end is a Europe that is at peace, undivided and democratic;
that is, a Europe that no longer requires intensive American
involvement to secure its future and, instead, is able and willing to
involve itself in world affairs politically, economically, and, if
necessary, militarily. Such a Europe requires that the new
administration continue where the Clinton administration left off,
which is by pursuing a strategy towards the region that puts Europe -
not NATO or Russia - first.
The Bush administration faces a full European agenda and a
pressing calendar of events. Existing commitments by the United
States, NATO, the EU and individual European states will force an
early inter-agency review and timely resolution of five key issues:
- NATO enlargement
At NATO's fiftieth anniversary gathering in April 1999, the 19
members agreed to hold another summit no later than 2002 to review the
progress made by the nine countries that have formally applied for
membership.6 These nine countries expect that
they will be invited to join if they have fulfilled the criteria. When Poland,
Hungary and the Czech Republic joined the alliance in March 1999, NATO promised
that membership would be open to other European states as well. The
2002 summit will provide a real (and possibly final) test for this
much-touted US and NATO policy of an 'open door' for new members. Key
members of the Bush foreign policy team, including Condoleezza Rice,
have expressed concern in the past that if NATO expands too quickly
into Central and Eastern Europe, it will be unable to function as an
effective and coherent military alliance.7
Others, including Rice's deputy, Stephen Hadley, are firmly committed to
enlargement.8 What is clear is that Washington's
attitude will be key: without clear and enthusiastic American support and
leadership, there will be no further NATO enlargement. In order to shepherd
a policy through the alliance before the summit, the Bush 74 administration
will have to decide by the end of 2001 which approach it will take.
- European security and defence policy
The EU has ambitiously set 2003 as a target date for achieving a
European defence capability that would allow deployment of 60,000
troops within two months for up to one year. After some initial
hesitation and concern that this plan might decouple US and European
security, entail a costly duplication of NATO efforts, and could
discriminate against non-EU members of NATO, the Clinton
administration embraced the European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) as an appropriate way of strengthening Europe's capacity for
military action.9 Opinions in the new administration
are mixed. Many fear that European efforts to build a real ESDP will come at the
expense of contributions to NATO - or duplicate alliance structures
and capabilities that already exist. At worst, in this view, the EU
could emerge not as a strengthened part of NATO, but as a competitor
of the one European institution in which the United States remains
dominant. Others see benefits of the European effort. If it leads to
enhanced military capacity - even if only for crisis management and
peacekeeping purposes - it will invariably help to relieve some of the
burden from an American military that many Republicans in particular
believe to be overstretched. Moreover, for many in Washington, the
problem is not so much Europe's desired military strength as its
actual weakness - which, as the Kosovo war dramatically underscored,
leaves the United States with the choice of seeing nothing done or
having to take on the military task largely on its own.
- National missile defense
Never comfortable with the idea of deploying defences against
ballistic missile attacks, and given the state of the existing
technology, President Clinton deferred a decision on deploying NMD to
his successor.10
But even if the technology remains uncertain, the
Bush administration will have to decide the issue early in its tenure
in order to be in a position to deploy even a limited system by
2006-07, by which time a state like North Korea or Iraq could possess
the capability to conduct a small-scale missile attack. Top officials
have suggested that the administration will decide to proceed with
deployment, but that still leaves the president to decide what kind of
system to deploy and how to deal with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty, which bars the deployment of any system he might favour. Rice
has called the ABM Treaty a 'relic' of the Cold War and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld has dismissed it as 'ancient history'.11 Much
of Europe, meanwhile, has been nervous about being left out of a
deployment decision, about Russia's adverse reaction, about the
consequences for multilateral efforts to stem weapons proliferation,
and about a scenario in which America can defend itself but not its
allies from missile attacks.12
In addition to avoiding a serious rift
in the alliance, there is also a more practical need to garner some
European support for an American missile defence programme: a serious
system will require upgrading radars in Greenland and the United
Kingdom, which means that, at the very least, officials in Copenhagen
and London will have to back the effort.
- The Balkans
During the presidential campaign, European countries grew uneasy
when then-Governor Bush implied that the United States was doing all
the work keeping the peace in Kosovo, and that under his
administration, Washington would turn operations there over to the
Europeans. With the resultant hue and cry, the Bush foreign policy
team assured NATO allies that it would consult them before taking any
action. Yet the main problem with these remarks (apart from what they
suggested about the Bush administration's mindset) is that they likely
will feed Congressional pressure to get Americans out. The United
States Congress already tried in 2000 to set a target date for
American withdrawal, and while candidate Bush opposed this effort, he
objected not on policy grounds but because the move would tie a new
president's hands. Many rank-and-file Republicans will grow restless
regarding the continuing American presence in Balkans peacekeeping
missions and will renew their pressure for a pullout. Again, the
administration will not have much time before it has to decide the
importance of a continued US deployment.
- Russia
When the Soviet Union broke apart, many in the West hoped that
Russia would succeed in building a market democracy and in joining the
West. President Boris Yeltsin was in most respects pro-Western, and
despite misgivings, he went along with the NATO deployment in Bosnia,
the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to include former Warsaw Pact
states, and even with the endgame to the war in Kosovo. Russia
succeeded in building an electoral democracy, but not one in which the
rule of law and freedom of expression were deeply established. And
while the command economy was dismantled, a functioning market economy
did not flourish. The Bush team was critical of the Clinton-Gore
policy towards Russia during the campaign, but it did not lay out an
alternative approach, other than to say it would not encourage further
International Monetary Fund assistance (which has not been provided
since 1998 in any event) and that it would not be as obsessed as
President Clinton allegedly was with Russia's internal
transformation. Given President Vladimir Putin's more carefree
approach towards democratic institutions than Yeltsin (who himself
fired on the Russian parliament when he felt it was necessary), there
could be the beginnings of an American effort to disengage from
Russia, at least with respect to attempts to include Moscow in
building the new Europe. How the administration decides to proceed
with NATO enlargement and missile defence will have a profound effect
on US-Russian relations and on whether Russia can truly become
integrated into European affairs. And how the United States gauges the
importance of Russia may in turn affect how it decides to proceed on
enlargement and NMD.
Given the multitude of other demands that the Bush foreign-policy
team will face, the natural temptation will be to address each issue
in turn as the need for a decision arises. Yet decisions on one set of
issues, say NATO enlargement and NMD, will invariably affect other
issues; for example, Russia and a separate European defence
capability. Even if these issues are addressed sequentially when the
need arises, it is vital that the Bush administration have some sense
of how they fit with other US goals for Europe. In this regard, there
are at least three different strategies for addressing the large and
complex European agenda - one that aims to strengthen NATO; another to
encourage Russia to continue its democratic and economic
transformation; and a third that seeks to build a Europe that is
peaceful, undivided and democratic. If past statements are any guide,
the Bush administration is likely to address the European agenda from
the perspective of putting NATO first. As Powell declared at his
confirmation hearings, NATO 'is the bedrock of our relationship with
Europe. It is sacrosanct. Weaken NATO, and you weaken Europe, which
weakens America'.13
From this perspective, the most important agenda
item in Europe is maintaining and strengthening a NATO whose primary
function would be to serve as a military alliance against threats to
member states. Putting NATO first would likely mean discouraging
European efforts to develop an independent defence capability. It
could also imply closing to door to further NATO enlargement on the
grounds that additional members would further dilute the alliance's
capacity to function effectively in a crisis or war - or at least
limiting enlargement to those countries that would contribute
militarily, geographically or strategically. The approach suggests a
downgrading of the Russian presence at NATO provided for by the 1997
NATO- Russia Founding Act, an agreement that key Republicans derided
for letting Moscow participate in a way that would allow it to create
havoc for NATO decision-making.14
And it would mean that efforts to
build missile defences would seek to embrace the NATO allies, by
making clear that any defence system would seek to defend them as well
as the United States. A second strategy would be to put Russia
first. The argument here (which has been put forward in the 1990s by
Democrats on Capitol Hill as well as by many academics, especially
Russia specialists) is that only Russia can pose a real threat to
America's core interests in Europe. Without question, problems can
arise in the Balkans or the Caucasus, but Russia, with its large
nuclear arsenal, is the country that matters most. Putting Russia
first would mean accepting some notion of a Russian sphere of
influence, especially in regions formerly part of the Soviet Union,
and thus eschewing NATO enlargement into the Baltic region. Indeed,
NATO enlargement as a whole would have to be put on the backburner,
given that the purported gains of inviting new members are outweighed
by the damage that does to relations with Moscow. It could also mean
not going forward with national missile defence, or perhaps only doing
so jointly with Moscow or when the threat environment leaves no other
choice. In short, this approach suggests, as does a recent report from
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the need for 'placing
a significant value on the US-Russian relationship and not sacrificing
it for the sake of special issues that arise, based on a misguided
assumption that Russia will always end up falling into line no matter
what the United States does'.15
Although the Bush administration is
unlikely to make many of its foreign policy decisions with an eye to
Moscow' s reaction, it is possible that the administration will
nevertheless place Russia at the centre of its European policy. Thus,
the strengthening of NATO - to include its strategic enlargement -
could be explained in part by the need to hedge against an uncertain
future vis-a-vis Russia. National missile defence, while deemed
necessary to deal with the threat of missile proliferation, could also
be justified as a useful insurance against an accidental or
unauthorised missile attack from Russia.16
And, more positively, if
Russia desires to play a constructive role in the Balkans - which is,
after all, of greater strategic significance to Moscow than to
Washington - then it could be argued that the United States should not
stand in its way. (This sentiment helps explain the view of some Bush
administration officials that the United States and NATO should never
have intervened in the region, and that doing so needlessly aggravated
relations with Russia, which had legitimate reasons to object.)
The Clinton administration pursued a third approach, different in
ways that are subtle but also important, of putting Europe first. The
goal of this approach was to build what President Clinton called a
'peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe', or, as former President
Bush called it, a 'Europe whole and free'.17
The principal means to
that end has been a strategy of enlargement - not just the
institutional enlargement of NATO and the EU, but a broader strategy
designed to extend the security and stability Western Europe has long
enjoyed to the rest of the continent.18
The Clinton administration's
Europe-first strategy contained four major elements:
promoting a stronger European Union to share the burden of
assisting central and eastern European countries to make the
transition from authoritarian command economies to market democracies;
transforming NATO into the primary security institution for all of
Europe by adapting its purpose to ensure Europe's overall security and
opening its doors to new members; engaging Russia as a key partner in
building the new Europe; and . bringing peace and stability to areas
of Europe, particularly the Balkans, in which violence and insecurity
persisted. From a US perspective, a peaceful, undivided and democratic
Europe is a means to a larger end, not just an end in itself. For only
in a Europe that is at peace, where divisions have been overcome and
democracy has triumphed, will it be possible for the major European
powers, working together in an expanded European Union, to bring their
full weight to bear outside the geographical confines of Europe. Only
in such a Europe, in other words, is Washington likely to have the
strong and full partner it seeks for addressing the myriad of
opportunities and challenges that exist in the current age of
globalisation.
Of these three approaches, putting Europe first is the most
appropriate strategy for advancing the full range of American
interests. Although putting NATO first has the potential to enhance
American leadership and perhaps to strengthen relationships with key
European allies, it would do so at a cost to other important goals,
including the promotion of a stronger Europe more capable and willing
to share the burdens of European and international security. A
NATO-centred approach, especially one that emphasises NATO's
traditional strengths and purposes, is also likely to complicate
needlessly relations with a Russia that still views the alliance as a
potential threat to its interests. And, while a Russia-first strategy
appropriately calls attention to the importance of dealing with the
residual nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction capabilities
that remain from Soviet days, the approach elevates US-Russian
relations at the expense of other important American interests in
Europe. By contrast, a strategy that puts Europe first serves American
interests in two fundamental ways. First, an undivided Europe that is
democratic and prosperous is unlikely to be the source of instability,
conflict and war that marked most of the twentieth century, wars that
kept the United States engaged at great cost and sacrifice. While
great progress has been made, there are still pockets of instability
and potential conflict that threaten escalation to a wider
conflagration. These include not only Bosnia and Kosovo, but also
relations between Greece and Turkey, turmoil in the Caucasus and
lingering suspicions between the Baltic countries and Russia. Second,
a strong Europe at peace with itself is more likely to be a full and
capable partner of the United States in addressing the many challenges
and opportunities around the world. A democratic Europe shares
America's values and interests. A prosperous Europe has the economic
and military capability to be a more equal partner with the United
States - both in Europe and beyond. And a Europe that includes Russia
will have finally settled a long-standing Western security concern,
thus enabling it to shift its focus and attention from the narrow
confines of Europe to broader concerns internationally. The Bush
administration should therefore embrace the European policy framework
set out by its predecessors. In so doing, it should be guided by five
policy precepts:
Promote a stronger Europe
The United States has long been an ambivalent supporter of
European integration efforts. While a stronger Europe would offer the
potential of more equitable burden-sharing, it would also be more able
and willing to take an independent - or even competitive - stance on
issues of importance to Washington. As a result, while successive
administrations adopted outwardly supportive policies towards European
efforts to enhance their cooperation and unity, they have often
expressed quiet concern when such efforts threatened to undermine
America's leadership role. Nowhere has this ambivalence been more
apparent than in the defence and security sphere. As the main provider
and guarantor of Europe's security for more than a half century,
Washington has consistently urged its European allies to do more. But
it has just as consistently warned them not to do so in ways that
challenged NATO or in any other way weakened alliance unity (and,
implicitly, Washington's uniquely leading role within the
organisation). While this ambivalent attitude was understandable at a
time when European security was precarious, it is less so now that the
major threat to NATO members and indeed, much of the rest of Europe,
has all but disappeared. NATO still performs unique functions. But
there is now clearly also scope for a larger security role by strictly
European organisations, such as the European Union. Indeed, the first
post-Cold War decade has demonstrated to many Europeans that continued
reliance on the United States for security in Europe can have
significant costs. For example, Washington may decide, as it did for
more than three years in regard to Bosnia, that its interests are not
affected by what happens in the region, even though these developments
do affect European interests. Conversely, Washington's military
pre-eminence can translate into strategies for using force - for
example, relying solely on airpower during the Kosovo war and
eschewing a possible ground campaign - that its European allies must
follow regardless of their own strategic preferences. Against this
background, it is not surprising that European countries have sought
to enhance their capacity for autonomous action in the defence realm,
notably by committing to deploy a 60,000-strong rapid-reaction
force. At least for some European countries, including notably the UK,
the impetus for this EU-based effort was not to create an alternative
to NATO, but to have independent options available if, for whatever
reason, the United States decides not to take part in a security
operation that these countries regard as important. Moreover, even if
Washington decided to participate, added military capability ought to
give Europe a larger voice at the military and strategy table. The
Clinton administration initially reacted with traditional American
wariness towards the idea that the European Union, of all
organisations, should, in the words of the Anglo-French statement that
launched the effort, 'have the capacity for autonomous action, backed
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'.
19
Washington believed that this effort, while welcome as a means to
enhance Europe's contribution to the common defence, also posed
potential risks, which Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summed up
as the three 'Ds': that it could decouple Europe's security from that
of the United States, duplicate what NATO already does in a costly and
ineffective way, and discriminate, notably against European NATO
allies that were not EU members.20
While the Clinton administration
subsequently welcomed the initiative as a useful complement to NATO,
key officials within and outside the administration remained extremely
wary of the possibility that a European defence effort would supplant
rather than supplement alliance efforts. Thus, Defense Secretary
William Cohen used his last meeting with his NATO colleagues to warn
that if the EU initiatives were not pursued carefully, NATO could
become 'a relic of the past'. Two key Republican Senators echoed the
sentiment that ESDP risked 'undermining - even destroying - the NATO
Alliance'.21
It is likely that the incoming administration will share many of
its predecessor's doubts about these European defence efforts.22 These
doubts, however, are misguided. The United States should show clear
support for ESDP for two main reasons. First, as Condoleezza Rice has
rightly argued, 'the greater danger is that European militaries will
not do enough, not that they 'll do too much'.23
Anything that
improves Europe's capacity to act, especially in the military sphere,
should therefore be welcomed. As for fears that a stronger Europe
would also be a more independent Europe, that is likely to be true,
but ought not to concern the United States too much. On the major
issues, the United States and Europe will probably see eye-to-eye,
while in any situation demanding the use of significant military
force, European governments will want Washington's full participation.
Finally, most European allies will remain committed to sound
transatlantic relations and will successfully oppose the presumed
efforts of countries like France to weaken that
relationship. Washington would do well, therefore, to trust London,
Berlin, the Hague, Copenhagen and others to ensure that ESDP evolves
in ways that are consistent with NATO's continued importance. Another
reason for supporting the recent European defence efforts is that a
future US-European strategic partnership depends on ESDP's
success. Only a stronger Europe can share with the US the burden of
maintaining international order. A more capable Europe will invariably
have a greater voice in decisionmaking councils - be it NATO or
elsewhere - and this greater influence implies that Washington may
well find itself more often on the losing side of an
argument. However, this is a price that the US should be willing to
pay for having partners that are better able to stand together in
meeting global challenges.
Transform NATO
NATO cannot justify its existence to either Europeans or
Americans if it serves merely as a military alliance against external
threats. Defending the member states is a relatively easy task, and
Europeans in particular will not feel any urgent need to provide more
funds for this purpose. In July 1990, NATO began the effort to
transform itself into a more political organisation whose purpose it
increasingly was to export security and stability to central and
eastern Europe. The means to that end were two-fold: first, by
shifting the primary military mission from territorial defence of its
members to ensuring all of Europe's security; and, second, by opening
membership to any interested European country so as to entice those
that desired to join to make the difficult political, economic and
military choices required to become full partners in the community of
market democracies. It is important to recognise that NATO is not an
end in itself; it is a means to an end. And that end should be the
elimination of interstate war in Europe, not the preservation of
NATO's Cold War form and function. Enlargement of the alliance to
include all European states that meet membership criteria will help
NATO meet this task. The evolution of NATO's mission from territorial
defence to ensuring security throughout Europe was completed in 1999
with the adoption of the new Alliance Strategic Concept. At the
fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington, the allies agreed that
since 'the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a justan
lstngpeceulorerinEuop',whchcoldbe'pt t is b riis ad onlit ffctngth
scuit of the Euro-Atlantic area', the purpose of NATO was now to
'contribute to peace and stability in this region'.24
This formal
commitment codified what had already become a practical reality: since
1995, NATO's primary focus, if not its main mission, has been to
stabilise the Balkans, the one area in Europe in which neither peace
nor stability prevailed. Increasingly, NATO has come to regard threats
to peace and stability anywhere in Europe as issues of direct interest
to the alliance, and even possible reasons for intervention,
especially since no other security organisation (be it the UN or the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) has proven
capable of doing so. Although the incoming administration may be
inclined to turn the clock back and emphasise NATO's original mission
as a defensive alliance, it is likely to find few takers in
Europe. Certainly, for most European allies, collective defence
remains a fundamental purpose of the alliance; however, its
contribution to overall European security is now generally regarded as
NATO's primary purpose. This is underscored by NATO's involvement in
the Balkans, which today is the main concern of diplomatic and
military leaders in Brussels. NATO conducted the first offensive
operations in its history in Bosnia in 1995, and it went to war for
the first time in Kosovo in 1999. Today, nearly 75,000 NATO troops are
deployed in south-eastern Europe, where their presence is a
fundamental source of stability and hope for the peoples of that
region. These operations are likely to be the alliance's future,
whereas standing guard to defend allied territory is clearly a mission
of the past. Enlargement is the second main element of NATO's
transformation. Contrary to the views of some supporters and
opponents, enlargement is not primarily about enhancing defence by
adding new members, nor is it primarily designed to hedge against the
possibility of Russia's re-emergence as a threat. Enlargement's main
goal is to extend the zone of stability and security further east by
providing states in the region with an incentive to undertake the
political, economic and military transitions necessary to become a
part of the European mainstream of market democracies. Those who
oppose enlargement should not underestimate what the prospect of
membership in leading Western institutions has already
accomplished. Poland's military was not eager to allow Western-style
civilian control and transparency, but it had no choice if it wished
to join NATO. Hungary could not afford to hang on to territorial
claims against Romania, and Romania could not afford to mistreat its
Hungarian minority. The Baltic states have had to satisfy Western
human-rights concerns regarding their Russian speaking populations.
In general, governments have had to make some painful economic,
military and political choices to stay in line for EU and NATO
membership. If the door closes, many of these governments could have a
hard time containing anti-Western sentiment among their
populations. This does not mean that NATO should rush its enlargement
process, but rather that it should stick to the open-door approach it
enunciated in the first round of post-Cold War enlargement. It should
be recognised that the 1949 Washington Treaty that established the
alliance embodied this approach. Article 10 allowed that any European
state could be invited to join, provided that it could contribute to
alliance security and further alliance principles. This is the
approach that NATO reaffirmed at its fiftieth anniversary summit when
it established a membership action plan, which committed NATO to meet
frequently with each prospective member to review that country's
progress in fulfilling the membership criteria. And it was to review
that progress that NATO announced it would hold its 2002 summit.
25 In
deciding the next step, NATO cannot let Russia dictate which European
countries can or cannot join. That would merely embolden Russia to
reassert a sphere of influence that should no longer have a place in
European affairs. It would also send the wrong signal as to what NATO
and the new Europe are all about. But neither should NATO move
precipitously. One approach discussed in 2000 in Washington, Brussels
and in central and eastern Europe was dubbed the 'Big Bang'...
26 The
aim was to get around the fact that each round of NATO enlargement was
tortuous, with no certainty for unsuccessful countries that the
process would even continue. The idea of the 'Big Bang' was that NATO
should simply admit all nine of the aspirant countries, or at least
Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
(leaving aside Macedonia and Albania). But if NATO does not stick to
rigorous standards regarding the ability of each candidate to
contribute to alliance security and to further core democratic and
market principles, then it will severely undermine its credibility
(and will likely lead the US Senate to reject the ratification). It
will mean that any leverage to ensure that countries make tough
choices at home will be lost. And finally, a Big Bang approach will
make it clear that Ukraine and Russia are not part of this
process. Neither country has applied to be a NATO member, but inviting
all of the aspirants in at one time will end the process, as its
proponents hope. In Ukraine's case, ambiguity regarding its future
relationship with NATO is useful in its relationship with Russia; and
in Russia's case, the insistence by NATO that the door is open
potentially even to Moscow has important, if largely symbolic,
value. Enlargement should be a step-by-step process in which the
possibility of membership for all European countries remains open. Any
country that wants to join and is demonstrably ready to do so should
be allowed entry - no sooner, and no later. If by 2002 only Slovenia
is ready, it should be invited to join, a step NATO could and should
have taken in 1999.27 If Lithuania
is also ready, then it should be
invited in, recognising that this step is painful for Russia to
contemplate. Recognising Russia's 'pain' and its interests in
Kaliningrad is not the same, however, as letting Russia prevent any
Baltic country from choosing its alliances.28
This right fundamentally
underpins the Helsinki process, as Mikhail Gorbachev conceded in 1990
during talks about German unification.
Engage Russia
A Europe without Russia cannot be peaceful, undivided and
democratic. If Russia remains on the outside, it will be a
destabilising presence for the Baltic countries, for Ukraine and the
Caucasus and for Western interests in central and south-eastern
Europe. It follows that the United States and Europe have much to gain
by engaging Russia as a partner in building the new Europe rather than
as a potential adversary. Success in this will depend primarily on
what Moscow does and wants, but also, at least in part, on how
Washington in particular deals with Russia as it struggles to emerge
from its past. Throughout President Putin's first year in office,
which included numerous meetings with Western European counterparts,
he reaffirmed his desire for Russia to be part of Europe.
29 The
problem for Putin's Russia is that Europe is about something more than
geography; it is also a set of values. For him to believe that Western
leaders will be willing to do business with him regardless of Russia's
internal evolution would be a misreading of Europe. It will be
important for the West to ensure that new divisions caused by the
enlargement of both the EU and NATO do not become onerous. While those
Baltic nations that meet NATO criteria should be allowed to enter the
alliance, NATO should take steps to reassure Moscow that the alliance
poses no threat to Russian security. At the very least, NATO should
encourage the Russians to help make the Permanent Joint Council,
provided for by the NATO-Russian Founding Act, truly serve as a
consultative body for areas of common interest, particularly to combat
the threats of terrorism and weapon proliferation. The council has
been hindered because many in NATO are still suspicious of Russia's
willingness to cooperate, and because Russia has feared that
cooperating on particular issues in the Permanent Joint Council will
give the North Atlantic Council a green light to act even if Russia is
not on board. Over the medium term, if Russia can stay on a democratic
path (and if it can find a political solution to its war on Chechnya),
then NATO will need to go beyond the Founding Act. From the very start
of the enlargement process in the early 1990s, Washington has been
careful to hold open the possibility of Russian membership of NATO,
while of course realising that full membership would be well down the
road. Yet, unlike smaller European states, which join NATO in part
for its Article 5 security guarantee, Russia can settle for less than
full membership, at least for an interim period. Like the EU, which
assigns members associate status as a way-station along the road to
membership NATO could create some kind of associate membership status
for Russia.
Negotiating such a status for a Russia that is seen as sharing
the values underpinning NATO could be a good target for the next 5-10
years. If Russia succeeds in joining the Western mainstream as the
decade goes on, it should have a place within NATO beyond the 'voice'
provided by the Founding Act.30 The Bush administration should not
base its policy on the assumption that its relationship with Russia
does not depend on Russia's internal transformation or that Russia is
inevitably a power that has to be contained in Europe or even that
Russia is still the great power in Europe. Russia's internal
transformation is crucial for any US effort to make Moscow a partner
in the new Europe, or even to address the immediate issues on the
nuclear-weapons agenda. It was Russia's internal transformation after
1985 that made the end of the Cold War possible in the first place. A
democratic Russia is the West's best hope for a cooperative
relationship. Moscow's interests will not always coincide with those
of America or of the Western European powers. Its geographic stretch
to the Pacific Ocean will always make it different from other European
countries. However, it does share interests with the West, and can
only succeed economically by fully joining the European mainstream
(which means, for example, becoming a member of the World Trade
Organisation). Its success will depend, in large part, not only on the
political and economic structures it adopts internally but also on its
ability finally to adjust to its loss in status. Its model should be
Britain after the Second World War, not Soviet Russia or Weimar
Germany after the First World War. The United States and Europe can
help by providing a meaningful place for Russia in Europe, if it
chooses to belong.
Enhance peace and stability in the Balkans
American engagement in the Balkans has been the core of a
strategy that put Europe first. So long as violence engulfed the
region and ethnic divisions characterised communities at every level,
and so long as authoritarian rule persisted, the Balkans were a
central concern for those committed to the new Europe. The reasons
were both intrinsic to what was happening in the region - where
violence was of a scale and brutality that Europe had not witnessed
since the Second World War - and tied to broader considerations, not
least the negative impact on US-European relations more generally.
Indeed, key elements of America's European policy - including efforts
to transform NATO by updating its missions and enlarging its
membership and to engage Russia as a potential partner - were held
hostage to events in Bosnia in the first part of the 1990s. The
Clinton administration eventually concluded that not only could a
peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe not be built while a
significant part of the continent was mired in conflict, but that
efforts to resolve that conflict could have a profoundly positive
effect on the broader strategy of building the new Europe.31 Getting
NATO fully involved in Bosnia and reasserting American leadership of
the diplomatic process proved crucial to ending the Bosnian war and
halting the brutal Serb oppression in Kosovo.32
Ending violence in the region proved equally important for
revitalising and transforming NATO into the organisation best able to
secure Europe's future. Active and deliberate involvement of Russia
in the diplomatic and peacekeeping aspects in the region also proved
important, both in mitigating some negative effects of NATO's
interventions in the Balkans and in shaping a new NATO-Russian
relationship that, at a minimum, secured Moscow's acquiescence in
NATO's enlargement. The 1990s have demonstrated that there can be no
substitute for NATO and American engagement in the Balkans. It would
be a profound mistake to believe that the positive developments
throughout the region - which include not only ending two brutal wars,
but the emergence of democratically elected regimes in every country
in the region - can be sustained without a continued American
role. Current conditions in the Balkans are no accident; they are the
product of deliberate choice. And while the resulting policies were
partly informed by humanitarian concern about the deplorable
conditions in the warravaged countries, they also reflected the
American interests in Europe. It follows that the United States should
remain fully engaged in the Balkans: diplomatically, economically and
militarily, for as long as an international presence is
required. Continued American military engagement is necessary to
sustain the international effort, including NATO's indispensable role
in maintaining peace and stability. A long-term military presence to
promote stability is nothing alien to American policymakers - the
United States has long-standing military commitments all over the
world, from the Sinai and the Persian Gulf to Korea and Japan. The
military presence in the Balkans is similarly an integral part of the
US commitment to Europe. Most Europeans would view any move to
withdraw American troops as an indication that this commitment was
weakening. At the same time, however, the Balkans is clearly an area
of more fundamental interest to America's European allies than to
Washington. This difference is, quite properly, reflected in their
respective contributions to the region - with Europe deploying nearly
80% of the military forces and funding almost 90% of the financial and
economic assistance. But it also needs to be reflected in the relative
diplomatic burden, where the United States continues to play the
leadership role, reflecting Washington's belief that European efforts
in the early 1990s to resolve the Balkan conflicts on their own were a
spectacular failure (although, in truth, this was due in part to the
United States offering advice without much material support) and that
concerted American leadership was necessary to end the Bosnian
war. But with democratic leaderships in power throughout the region,
and the key challenges confronting the Balkan states primarily
economic rather than security-related, a continued insistence that
Washington must lead diplomatically, even though Europe pays the bill
and provides most of the troops, is no longer sustainable. And while
the European Union and its members have yet to forge a coherent
strategy for helping to integrate the region into the European
mainstream, they have had little incentive to do so as long as the
United States insisted on leading the diplomatic charge.
In short, the United States should remain engaged in the region,
including by deploying a small percentage of the military force in
Bosnia and Kosovo so long as a security presence is required. But
Washington's overall posture should be one of supporting rather than
leading the EU effort. Rebuilding societies in the Western image - by
promoting democracy, multi-ethnicity, and market economies - is best
left to those countries in Europe most immediately affected by what
goes on in the region. The Balkans should occupy a place on the
margins, rather than at the centre, of American foreign policy.
Proceed with care on national missile defense
The ability of the Bush administration to pursue many of its
European policy objectives will hinge on its approach to ballistic
missile defences. At all levels, the new administration has made it
clear that deployment will proceed; the only question is what kind of
system and when. Handled in ways that are responsive to the concerns
of others, the deployment of missile defences can enhance
security. But a decision to proceed without regard for the views of
others could cause grave damage to relations, and even weaken US
security. Since the issue of missile defence returned to the
transatlantic agenda in the late 1990s, Europeans have voiced various
concerns about possible deployment. Three stand out. First, even those
Europeans who accept that states like North Korea, Iran, or Iraq may
in the future deploy ballistic missiles capable of threatening the
United States worry that the deployment of limited defences could
weaken the transatlantic security link that is the foundation of
NATO. Second, many in Europe believe that a rush to deploy missile
defences will further weaken non-proliferation efforts by substituting
unilateral response to the developing threat for coordinated,
multilateral action designed to prevent the acquisition of missiles
and weapons of mass destruction. Third, and most important, nearly
every European government fears that if Washington proceeds with
deployment by withdrawing from the ABM Treaty rather than negotiating
the treaty's modification, relations with Moscow will suffer
significantly and thus undermine efforts to build the new Europe. The
Bush administration should recognise that these European concerns are
real and not easily dismissed. It is not enough to pay lip-service to
these worries, or to engage in an intensive round of consultations,
only to proceed with deployment as planned. The nature of any
deployment, as well as the manner in which to proceed, must be
discussed within NATO and with Russia in an effort to forge a
compromise strategy. Even if these discussions fail to produce
complete agreement, it is vital that the administration demonstrate a
commitment to trying to get the allies and Russia on board. Ignoring
their concerns completely is certain to cause a major transatlantic
row that will undermine much of what has been achieved to
date. Fortunately, it should be possible to proceed with missile
defences in ways that minimise these frictions.33 America should make
clear that the explicit purpose of missile defences is to provide the
United States and its NATO partners with a measure of insurance
against a small-scale missile attack rather than to provide them with
perfect protection; that a decision to deploy will be embedded in a
broader non-proliferation strategy; and that Washington will commit to
modifications in the ABM Treaty and other arms control ideas that meet
Moscow's primary concerns about the continued viability of its
dwindling offensive nuclear capacity. Given the current state of
technology, the only real purpose of deploying missile defences is to
provide a measure of insurance in an uncertain world. In particular,
Washington must abandon any thought of building defences to protect
the United States against a putative Chinese missile attack. Not only
is today's conceivable technology not up to the task, but a defence
against China implies building a system of a size and scope that is
far above what would be required to deal with the missile threat from
states like North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. As an insurance against such a
limited threat, defences will replace neither offences nor
deterrence. At most, a defensive system can bolster deterrence by
giving an extra measure of protection and thereby enhance the
credibility of retaliatory threats. Second, missile defences are just
one among a range of tools to deal with the proliferation of advanced
technologies. US and European non-proliferation efforts involve action
on three different levels: actions to prevent countries from acquiring
technologies; steps to persuade countries that have acquired the
technologies to give them up; and efforts to manage situations in
which countries possess advanced weapons technologies. Missile defence
deployments are most appropriate at the final stage, when the
objective is to manage the consequences of proliferation. They may
also provide an incentive for proliferators to give up the
capabilities that have been acquired. But it would be folly to put all
of one's non-proliferation eggs in the missile defence basket on the
incorrect assumption that acquisition is a foregone conclusion. It is
not. The weapons-proliferation problem is geographically and
strategically constrained, involving only a handful of countries in
the Middle East, South Asia and North-east Asia. In other parts of the
world, proliferation rollback efforts have also proved effective,
including the dismantlement of nuclearweapons programmes in Ukraine
and South Africa, as well as of missile programmes in Argentina and
Brazil. It may well be necessary - and even prudent - to complement
non-proliferation and rollback efforts with the deployment of
defences, but the latter cannot substitute for the former. Any
attempt to do so, moreover, would constitute another source of
transatlantic friction, for the European allies remain fully committed
to pursuing the full spectrum of non-proliferation efforts. Third,
while Moscow remains firmly opposed to major changes in the ABM
Treaty, it appears committed to intensifying the strategic dialogue
with the new administration in an effort to reach an acceptable
compromise.34 A US- Russia compromise on this issue will not be easy,
but it is crucial that Washington makes the attempt, in order to
retain European support for the effort. The critical element of any
negotiation to modify the ABM Treaty must be to seek changes that
accept the treaty's three cardinal prohibitions: banning the
deployment of strategically significant missile defences (implying the
need to limit the number and deployment location of interceptors);
preventing the possibility of a rapid break-out from treaty
constraints (making necessary strict limits on the kind and number of
sensors that can be developed and deployed); and averting the
circumvention of agreed limits (suggesting the importance of limiting
the capabilities of anti-satellite and other non-missile defensive
systems). Given the limited purpose of deploying missile defences, it
should be possible to devise treaty amendments that allow for
deployment of limited systems within these parameters, for example, by
constraining the number of land-based interceptors that can be
deployed and agreeing to a ban on spacebased weaponry. No European
country is enthusiastic about the possible deployment of missile
defences, and a headlong rush to deployment is bound to create a major
crisis within NATO. But a carefully crafted strategy designed to meet
key European and Russian concerns can mitigate the negative
fallout. Europe will have to accept that deployment of a limited
defence is necessary. Russia will have to agree to modify the ABM
Treaty in ways that loosen constraints on deployment while still
retaining the core prohibitions of the treaty, or else accept that the
United States withdraws from the treaty. And the United States will
have to acknowledge that missile defences will not provide the
absolute protection its advocates have long sought, but instead fulfil
the more limited, yet still useful purpose of providing some
protection against small-scale attacks.
Conclusion
Europe today is more peaceful, less divided and more democratic
than at any time in the modern era. This is not an accident, but the
outcome of deliberate policy. The US role in this effort was
crucial. For more than 50 years, the United States has pursued a
policy toward Europe that aimed at strengthening the democratic core -
first in the West and, once the Berlin Wall came down, in the
East. The immediate challenge is to ensure that the process started at
the end of the Cold War will be brought to fruition, so that a
peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe, stretching from the
Atlantic to the Urals (and beyond), will finally have been
created. That implies clear policy choices: Washington should fully
support the development of a strong Europe; NATO enlargement must
continue; Russia cannot be left to its own devices but must be
encouraged into a cooperative partnership; some American troops will
have to remain in the Balkans for quite some time; and the United
States should proceed with deliberate care in deploying limited
missile defences. Although success in building a peaceful, undivided,
and democratic Europe would be a historic achievement in itself, it is
important to remember that, for the United States, such a Europe is a
means to a larger end. Such a Europe would require less American
presence and investment than has been the case for over a
century. More importantly, a strong Europe would be the best possible
partner of the United States in dealing with the myriad of global
challenges and opportunities. That strategic partnership, rather than
a 'new division of labour', should be the fundamental goal of
America's European policy in the twenty-first century
Notes
1 Quoted in Michael R. Gordon, 'Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekeeping
in Balkan Fights', New York Times, 21 October 2000, p. A1.
2 Stephen Fidler and Richard Wolffe, 'Bush Seeks to Reassure Nato',
Financial Times, 1 November 2000, p. 4; and Michael R. Gordon, 'NATO
Chief Says Bush Aide Reassured Him on Balkan Stance', New York Times,
1 November 2000, p. A11.
3 Gordon, 'Bush Would Stop U.S. Peacekeeping in Balkan Fights';
Condoleezza Rice, 'Time Nears for Homecoming', USA Today, 24 October
2000, p. 16A; statement by Colin Powell, in 'Remarks at Announcement
of Powell's Nomination as Secretary of State', New York Times, 17
December 2000, p. 39; and 'Excerpts from Interview with
President-Elect George W. Bush', New York Times, 14 January 2001,
p. 28.
4 Condoleezza Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', Foreign
Affairs, vol. 77, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2000), p. 62. See also Bush's
statement in '2nd Presidential Debate Between Gov. Bush and Vice
President Gore', New York Times, 12 October 2000, p. A22.
5 Cf. George W. Bush, 'A Distinctive American Internationalism',
Speech at the Ronald W. Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA,
19 November 1999, available at http:// www.georgebush.com/News/
speeches/111999_intl.html (accessed December 2000); and Colin Powell's
statement, in 'Remarks at Announcement of Powell's Nomination as
Secretary of State'.
6 See 'Washington Summit Communiqué', issued by the Heads of State
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council, NAC S (99) 64, Washington, 24 April 1999, para. 7.
7 John Hall, 'Bush adviser urges limits to U.S. intervention', The
Tampa Tribune, 8 September 1999, p. 7.
8 See Stephen Hadley, Defining the Path to a Peaceful, Undivided,
and Democratic Europe, Special Report No. 60 (Washington DC: US
Institute of Peace, June 2000, p. 4; and 'Republican Platform 2000:
Renewing America's Purpose. Together', available at
http://www.rnc.org/2000/ 2000platform8aaa.
9 Cf. Madeleine K. Albright, 'The Right Balance Will Secure Nato's
Future', Financial Times, 7 December 1998, p. 22; and William
S. Cohen, 'Remarks at the Informal NATO Defense Ministerial Meeting'
(Birmingham, UK: 10 October 2000).
10 See 'Remarks by the President on National Missile Defense',
Address at Georgetown University (The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, 1 September 2000).
11 Rice, 'Promoting the National Interest', p. 59.
12 See François Heisbourg, 'Brussels' Burden', Washington
Quarterly, vol. 223, no. 3 (Summer 2000), pp. 127-133; Steven
Cambone, Ivo Daalder, Stephen Hadley, and Christopher Makins, European
Views of National Missile Defense, Policy Paper (Washington DC: The
Atlantic Council of the United States, September 2000), and Philip
Gordon, 'Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance', Survival,
vol. 43, no.1 (Spring 2001).
13 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the Nomination of
Colin Powell to be Secretary of State, 17 January 2001.
14 See, for example, the concerns expressed by Senator Jesse Helms
in The Debate on NATO Enlargement, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 105 Cong. 1 sess. (Government Printing
Office, 1998), pp. 18-19.
15 An Agenda for Renewal: US-Russian Relations, A Report of the
Russian and Eurasian Program (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, December 2000), p. v.
16 See statements by George W. Bush, in 'New Leadership on National
Security ' (Washington DC: 23 May 2000), available at http://
www.bush2000.com; and 'Comments by Bush and Rumsfeld on Selection for
the Secretary of Defense', New York Times, 29 December 2000, p. A16.
17 See, respectively, 'Statement by the President Clinton' (The
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 31 October 1995); and
'Remarks by President Bush to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic
of Germany' (31 May 1989), available at http://
bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/ 89053104.html.
18 The intellectual edifice of the strategy was set forth by
Clinton's first national security adviser, Anthony Lake, 'From
Containment to Enlargement', Address at the School of Advanced
International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, 23 September
1993. See also, Hadley, Defining the Path to a Peaceful, Undivided,
and Democratic Europe.
19 'Statement on European Defense' (Saint-Malo, France:
Franco-British Summit, 4 December 1998), para. 2.
20 Albright, 'The Right Balance Will Secure Nato's Future.'
21 Quoted in Alexander Nicoll, 'Cohen says European rapid reaction
force must use Nato military planners', Financial Times, 7 December
2000, p. 2; and Senators Jesse Helms and Gordon Smith, 'European
Defense Policy is Dangerous', Letter to the Editor, Daily Telegraph,
28 December 2000, p. 31.
22 Opposition to such efforts outside NATO were roundly condemned
in the early 1990s by many of the same people that are now returning
to government. For example, at the Rome NATO summit in November 1991,
then-President George Bush had warned his NATO colleagues that if
'your ultimate aim is to provide individually for your own defense,
the time to tell is today.' The principal concerns about European
defense efforts were detailed in the infamous 'Bartholomew telegram'
sent to NATO posts in February 1991. The telegram is reprinted as an
annex in Willem van Eekelen, Debating European Security: 1948-1998
(The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998), pp. 340-44.
23 Quoted in Martin Kettle, 'Bush Adviser Warns Europe to Spend
More on Arms ', The
Guardian, 7 June 2000.
24 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept,' approved by the Heads of
State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23-24 April 1999, para 6,
available at http:// www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99- 065e.htm.
25 'Washington Summit Communiqué', para. 7.
26 William Drozdiak, 'Nine Nations United in Bid to Join NATO',
Washington Post, 20 May 2000, p. A16.
27 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, 'Invite Slovenia to
Join', Washington Times, 23 April 1999, p. A21.
28 Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'NATO: the Dilemmas of Expansion', The
National Interest, Fall 1998, pp. 13-17.
29 For a flavour of these relationships, see Carol J. Williams,
'Putin, Schroeder Smooth Ties and Cement Deals', Los Angeles Times, 17
June 2000, pp. A1, 4; and Henry Meyer, 'British PM Blair to cement
ties with Putin in Russia visit', Agence France
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